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Abstract 
 
 
It seems that complaints about Heidegger’s style of writing are common fare in secondary literature and 
the classroom. This paper argues that both Heidegger’s obtuseness and obscurantism work as 
methodological devices for effectively communicating and demonstrating his thought. By obfuscating, he 
forces breakdowns, which pulls the reader out of her ready-to-hand mode of reading/revealing, which 
otherwise threatens to fall into comprehending via reference from one’s average everydayness. By being 
obscure in some passages where taking the meaning in multiple ways will not interfere with the main 
points being made, Heidegger enables his students to form personal (existentiell) interpretations, 
allowing for the possibility of authenticity. Therefore, one of the most hated aspects of B&T is actually 
the demonstrative reification of its key concepts. Whether purposeful or not on the part of Heidegger, this 
methodology proves essential for understanding his thought. 
 
 
 
 
Introduction: Why wrestle with Being and Time? 
 
Many classes, lectures, or books on Heidegger’s work will, in their introductory 
remarks, apologize for his writing style. These apologies typically take the form of a 
disclaimer. This paper proposes an apology as well, but in the rarer and more literal 
sense of the word: a defense.1  
 
Although Heidegger is notorious for his infuriating writing style, he remains one of the 
most influential thinkers of the 20th century. Many students turn to Being and Time 
                                                          
1 Oxford English Dictionary: “The pleading off from a charge or imputation, whether expressed, 
implied, or only conceived as possible; defence of a person, or vindication of an institution, etc., 
from accusation or aspersion.” 
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(B&T)2 at some point in their studies to only return perplexed, if not angry. While 
frustration is no doubt merited, the challenge of undertaking such a project is 
guaranteed to be worthwhile for many reasons, a few of which will be discussed in this 
introduction.  
 
Known for opening new dimensions of thought in its own right, B&T also works as a 
gateway to some of the most important thinkers of the 20th Century. However, recent 
controversies over Heidegger’s Nazi affiliations raise healthy concerns that may deter 
some students from seriously grappling with B&T. It is therefore important to point to 
the fact that Heidegger’s own moral deficiencies catalyzed those ethical thinkers to 
follow, who themselves, as Heidegger’s most penetrating and insightful critics, cannot 
be understood without first knowing to what it is they are responding to. As Levinas 
said, “Even if one frees oneself from the systematic rigors of [Heidegger’s] thought, 
one remains marked by the very style of [B&T’s] analyses, by the ‘cardinal points’ [i.e. 
finitude, being-there, being-toward-death, etc.] to which the ‘existential analytic’ 
refers.”3 If one has an interest in thinkers such as Levinas, Arendt, Jonas, Marcuse, 
Derrida, Gadamer, Merleau-Ponty, Sartre, or Foucault, just to name a few, it must be 
realized that Heidegger acts as the gatekeeper to their thought. As Iain Thomson has so 
convincingly argued concerning Levinas,4 to bypass B&T results in a fundamental 
impairment to reading those it influenced. 
 
Why does Heidegger stand as the gatekeeper to these thinkers? What is it about his 
thought that made so many of his students’ contributions to their various fields so 
influential? I will be arguing that the process of studying Heidegger itself acts as a 
mental reconfiguration that provides access to entirely revolutionary orientations of 
one’s own way of being-in-the-world; in other words, instead of cluttering one’s 
thoughts with additional knowledge to be heaped upon or against pre-existing 
assumptions, the study of B&T clears a region for authentic thinking in a less 
obstructed light.5  Even when, with someone like Foucault, the influence is less 
obvious, one can reasonably doubt that his work would have provided such a novel 
perspective if not for Heidegger’s clearing. Indeed, near the end of his life Foucault 
gave credit to Heidegger as always being his “essential philosopher.”6 
 
                                                          
2 Although much of what will be argued in this paper can and probably does apply to his later 
work, this paper focuses on B&T as the essential Heidegger text. 
3 Levinas, Emmanuel. Ethics and Infinity, Richard A. Cohen. (Pittsburg: Duquesne University 
Press, 1985), 41. 
4 Thomson, Iain. "Rethinking Levinas on Heidegger on Death," The Harvard Review of 
Philosophy, Vol. XVI (Fall 2009), pp. 23-43. 
5 Heidegger, Martin. Being and Time, trans. Macquarrie and Robinson (New York: Harper & 
Row, 1962), 167.  
6 Elden, Stuart. Mapping the Present: Heidegger, Foucault and the Project of a Spatial History. 
(Bloomsbury Academic: 2002) 1. 
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One might wonder why they cannot just derive the basic gist of B&T from a 
secondhand account? This paper will show why only a firsthand reading can truly 
disclose Heidegger’s key insights. B&T does not have pieces of information to dump 
into the mind of its readers; it is an activity that must be undergone for understanding. 
The means by which Heidegger conveys ideas is itself the process that reveals his key 
insights to be what they are. My thesis is that without being both obscure and obtuse7 
B&T would have only been able to tell what it meant, but with its style as it is, the 
essential insights are shown firsthand. In other words, if my thesis is correct, then to be 
spoon fed Heidegger's conclusions by a secondary source alone will not provide a 
sufficient demonstration of how his phenomenology maps to reality, but will instead 
need to be taken on faith (a leap many will understandably not be willing to take).  
 
Therefore, this paper is not meant to be a secondary source that explains B&T, but 
rather a primary defense of its methodology, meant only to encourage and redirect the 
reader back to the project at hand. Rather than arguing about the validity of any given 
claim made by Heidegger, therefore, the point of this paper is to show that his style 
works, in a sense, to prove the overarching ideas put forward in B&T. 
 
Average everydayness, and the readiness-to-hand of language 
 
“Language is the house of Being. In its home human beings dwell.”8 
 
A central accomplishment by Heidegger in B&T is in how he illuminates the way that 
average everydayness flattens/restricts (hitherto 'levels') Dasein’s possible ways of 
being in the world, alienating us from the way things actually are or can be. Language, 
and the preontological9 interpretations that come with it, forms the structure of this 
average everydayness.10 
 
Heidegger spends half of chapter three in B&T establishing that Dasein’s world11 is a 
relational totality of significance, which is the very structure of Dasein’s world.12 We 
are so absorbed in our worlds that significance itself is always familiar to us (which 
                                                          
7 Heidegger is much more obtuse (difficult) than obscure (ambiguous). Indeed, most obscurities 
are due to translation or plays on words that don't necessarily detract from what is being 
presented.  
8 Heidegger, Martin. Pathmarks: Letter on "Humanism." (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1998). 239.  
9 In this case meaning the presuppositional understanding of the Being of beings. 
10 Heidegger, Martin. Being and Time, trans. Macquarrie and Robinson (New York: Harper & 
Row, 1962), 213. 
11 When we speak of “world” here, we will be referring to the worlds of our understanding, 
practical involvements, care and concern (otherwise, if we mean the world as is typically 
thought, we will put it in quotes as Heidegger does (B&T p. 93): ‘world’). 
12 Ibid., 120 
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means its presence is least obvious13); it is by this familiarity alone that we are able to 
understand and interpret in the first place. “Upon these [significations which Dasein 
discloses], in turn, is founded the Being of words and of language.”14 
 
Therefore, Dasein’s house of being is language, and language’s being is founded on 
significations which are disclosed by Dasein in the first place. Dasein discloses worlds, 
and “Dasein is its world existingly.”15 This means that we world as a verb: “Dasein is 
its disclosedness.”16 All of this is to say that language, and our 
interpretations/disclosures of the world are absolutely fundamental to Dasein. 
 
As empowering as this may at first sound, the meaning brought to light by these facts 
takes us for a darker turn. For language, and the predisclosed interpretations it is 
founded on, is not something any single Dasein creates for itself; for it is, in essence, a 
very public thing. We do not choose our first language, historic position (with its 
consequential preontological understanding), nor the conceptual frameworks we have 
found ourselves thrown into.  
 
The meaning signified by language deteriorates over time with use, and is then built 
upon less than carefully, with little to no consideration of its origins or to the 
phenomena with which it was originally concerned.17 Heidegger thinks this diminution 
of language leads to a leveling in Dasein’s possibilities for being18, and an inevitably 
widening separation from what is.19 This is why Heidegger's method is hermeneutics 
grounded in phenomenology (i.e. reviving/reclaiming meaning through rigorous and 
careful interpretation with special attention given to both the development of language 
through history and its relation to the phenomena itself under question).  
 
Average everydayness situates Dasein in the world. Dasein’s primary mode of dealing 
with entities in the world is ready-to-hand, while its derivative mode of encounter is 
present-at-hand.20 When Dasein engages entities as ready-to-hand, Dasein is absorbed 
                                                          
13 Ibid., 69. “That which is ontically closest and well known, is onto-logically the farthest and not 
known at all ; and its ontological signification is constantly overlooked.” 
14 Ibid., 121 
15 Ibid., 416 
16 Ibid., 171 
17 Ibid., 213. “The fact that something has been said groundlessly, and then gets passed along in 
further retelling, amounts to perverting the act of disclosing into an act of closing off. For what is 
said is always understood proximally as ‘saying’ something—that is, an uncovering of 
something. Thus, by its very nature, idle talk is a closing-off, since to go back to the ground of 
what is talked about is something which it leaves undone.” 
18 Ways of being for Dasein encompass both thought and action, a division Heidegger avoids 
most of the time, but that I mention for the sake of clarity.  
19 Ibid., 165. “By publicness everything gets obscured, and what has thus been covered up gets 
passed off as something familiar and accessible to everyone.” 
20 Ibid., 121 
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in the relational continuum of its projects and world of concern. When Dasein 
encounters entities as present-at-hand they are treated as isolated and divisible objects 
opposed to an inquiring subject. Subsequently, presence-at-hand is the mode through 
which objects are encountered in scientific and logical analyses. Reductive analyses of 
this type, which subject “the manifold to tabulation” through systematic categorization 
and comparison, can reveal aspects of an object’s constitution, but Heidegger argues 
this form of understanding is prone to cover up understanding of the more fundamental 
ready-to-hand character of beings.21 For example, does one come to a better 
understanding of a bicycle’s meaning by reading its user’s manual, or by getting on and 
riding it? The former way of understanding is the present-at-hand mode of being, 
whereas the latter, being engaged with the bicycle riding activity itself, is the ready-to-
hand.  
 
Breakdowns 
 
Throughout one’s average everyday engagements one typically remains in the mode of 
readiness-to-hand unless there is a breakdown. For example, a student engages her 
bicycle as ready-to-hand as she rides from school to work. While riding, the individual 
parts of the bicycle are of no immediate concern so long as the bicycle is functioning 
properly. Indeed, the bicycle is acting as a prosthetic, meaning that at its best it 
functions in the background. If the chain slips off and jams, then the bike stops 
functioning as ready-to-hand and becomes unready-to-hand, which means it poses a 
problem. Thrown off track and out of the ready-to-hand, she is now forced to either fix 
the bike or jog to work. 
 
When such a breakdown occurs and one is thrown out of the ready-to-hand, this is 
typically when one goes into the present-at-hand mode of analysis.22 With our cyclist, 
for example, if she decides to fix the chain, then she will have to first pull out of the 
engaged absorption in the world of her concern to assess the immediate situation. 
Doing so involves analyzing the bicycle as a distinct object made up of divisible parts, 
taking into consideration how the pieces relate, zeroing in on the problem's source, and 
then working it out until the chain is back on track. In short, breakdowns light up 
problems that, if attended to, allow us to get back on our way. 
 
Remember that we find ourselves thrown into a world of existing language and 
interpretations. The interpretations of the They23 forms the bedrock of assumptions 
upon which all subsequent analysis or theorizing arises (the ‘preontological,’ which is 
                                                          
21 Ibid., 77 
22 Ibid., 103. “Anything which is un-ready-to-hand… enables us to see the obstinancy of that 
with which we must concern ourselves [before we can] do anything else.” 
23 For our purposes, one can think of the “They” as any given person’s cultural 
norms/standards/average possibilities. 
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basically one's implicit understanding of being, mediating experience before theory has 
been thought). This bedrock of assumptions is the accrued sediment of inferred 
meaning which we find ourselves thrown into and under before we have ever 
considered the possible contingencies and theory-laden-meanings entailed by our 
historic position in the world. This structures our average everydayness, which is 
primarily ready-to-hand. 
 
What does this all have to do with the actual style of writing Heidegger utilizes? 
Because this bedrock laid by language structures our average everyday way of being in 
the world, and therefore our possibilities for interpreting phenomena, the need to get 
outside of language is made clear. But language cannot be transcended, and is prone to 
being ready-to-hand. Like with a prosthetic operating at its best, language falls to the 
background of our conscious life by means of habituated familiarity. Even when some 
words fail us, we analyze their breakdown with language. Language is, therefore, akin 
to a bicycle we cannot get off.  
 
If language is a circle from which we cannot be extricated, and with which we 
constantly fall back into a ready-to-hand relationship, then what is the best method for 
arriving at a freer relationship with it? One possible way is to carefully work from 
within the circle of language to develop a more sophisticated standpoint from which to 
gain perspective and insight; but doing so efficiently requires the best-possible severing 
from our current standpoint's entanglements, or else all will be self-referential to our 
imbedded preontological understanding. 
 
This is where Heidegger comes in. With his infamously tedious reclamation and 
appropriation of language, he carefully tends to the construction of a hermeneutic circle 
that will give us a better understanding of the phenomena with which language is 
concerned.  
 
To summarize thus far: average everydayness is primarily experienced in the mode of 
readiness-to-hand, with presence-at-hand being a secondary possible mode of encounter 
when breakdowns occur. Therefore, in order to get outside the entrapments of average 
everydayness and its thinking, which is habitually ready-to-hand, Heidegger forces 
breakdowns to occur.  
 
To be ushered into a hermeneutic circle dealing with fundamental ontology is no easy 
task; it is similar to acquiring a new language, only with a dramatic difference: Whereas 
in acquiring a foreign tongue we relate the alien words to our current understanding, 
Heidegger’s hermeneutic circle requires our being continuously knocked off course 
whenever we try too hastily to relate to our preconceived notions or revert to standard 
linguistic forms. Conventional language allows what is being given to be conveyed 
without the theoretic edifices behind the words themselves being brought out in the 
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open. By consistently breaking these conventions, Heidegger forces language to stop in 
its tracks—forcing us off track. Like a Zen master’s Keisaku to the distracted novice’s 
back24, Heidegger’s language is a baseball bat to the stained glass windows of our 
average everydayness.   
 
Forcing breakdowns forces us to agonizingly read what is being said as present-at-hand 
over and over again until these alien concepts and ways of thinking can become 
familiar. The feeling of confusion and irritation when being tripped by an obtuse turn of 
phrase is the feeling of a breakdown occurring: being-forced-from-average-
everydayness. Heidegger teaches stepping out of average everydayness and orienting 
oneself into his hermeneutic circle like a swimming instructor who throws her student 
into the deep end of the pool to either drown or intuitively find their bearings.  
 
Heidegger’s obfuscation is used to breakdown our average everyday mode of reading. 
His obscurity, when used, is most often wordplay. These flirtatious plays on words are 
complicated through translation, and it is regrettable so much nuance is lost for those of 
us restricted to the English translation. Important to remember is that the obscurities are 
never fundamentally important to the general thrust of his work. Heideggerian 
scholarship divides on interpretations about many things, but typically not the essential 
ideas.  
 
Furthermore, authenticity as Heidegger sees it has to do heavily with interpretation. We 
fundamentally begin with the leveled interpretations of the They as our possible 
operating assumptions. B&T takes on the task of shedding light on Dasein’s universal 
existential structures (existentiales), as well as on the existential structures which can be 
personally modified for a more authentic existence (existentiells).25 While he clearly 
wants us to get his ‘general thrust,’ I suggest that purposeful obscurantism may have 
been dealt in any place where multiple interpretations (a) are not harmful to the overall 
point being made, and (b) allow one to develop their own way of thinking about the 
matter at hand, so as to make it impossible for the pupil to literally subsume all of 
Heidegger’s thought. In this way, being forced to interpret is being forced into 
authenticity. If true, then it should be of little surprise that so many of his students 
proved to be original and influential thinkers in their own right.  
 
In summary 
 
We all find ourselves thrown into average everydayness, which is itself situated in 
language which we habitually use as ready-to-hand. Heidegger's methodology throws 
us out of this average everyday understanding repeatedly. Being thrown out of our 
                                                          
24 A ‘Keisaku’ is the stick used by Zen masters to swat their distracted or tired students back to 
awareness. 
25 Ibid., 168 
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average everydayness forces us to make Being and Time our most purposeful reading. 
Gaining anything from it requires that we truly commit.  
 
Committing to this project yields the fruits promised by those who testify to its 
revolutionary nature. Or, perhaps better stated: undergoing the process of following 
Heidegger's thought eventually makes provides the distance needed to gain an entirely 
new perspective on both language and ontology itself. Because the hermeneutic circle is 
founded on phenomenology, this fresh outlook revolutionizes the way one engages 
one’s world itself. But this does not mean one remains a Heideggerian forever after. 
Few of the students most influenced by Heidegger’s work agreed with him on much, 
and many became his most insightful critics.  
 
Although this entire paper has been a defense of obscurity and obtuseness in 
Heidegger’s style, I do not mean to indorse obscurity or obtuseness in general. It seems 
apparent that Heidegger’s style set off a trend, especially among certain French 
philosophers, of unnecessarily complex philosophical writing.26 While aspects of my 
argument could be used in defense of, for instance, Foucault, Derrida, or Levinas, I 
believe the impact of these arguments would miss their mark if used for other thinkers. 
This is due specifically to the very phenomena Heidegger was grappling with. Average 
everydayness, readiness-to-hand of language, and forcing breakdowns to make the 
pupil contend with the ideas in a present-at-hand manner, are concepts repeatedly 
reified by Heidegger’s very style. I make no claims about whether or not this style is 
necessary for revealing other phenomena. In fact, if anyone is getting any ideas about 
imitating this methodology, please, for the sake of your future readers, choose to write 
clearly. 
                                                          
26 Springer, Mike. " Searle on Foucault and the Obscurantism in French Philosophy." Open 
Culture. July 1, 2013. 
http://www.openculture.com/2013/07/jean_searle_on_foucault_and_the_obscurantism_in_french
_philosophy.html. 
 
